It has been revealed that easyJet shareholders approved Apollo’s £5.7bn ($7.6bn) takeover on November 11, with 97.07% of votes cast in favor at the court meeting and 96.67% at the general meeting. Apollo is paying £7.15 a share in cash, a staggering 81% premium to where easyJet traded before the bidding started in late May. Castlelake opened the tender and had a £6.25 offer rejected in June. Apollo reached terms on July 10 and the board recommended it on August 6.
Founder, Sir Stelios Haji-Ioannou and his family, held about 15.3% and is rolling the stake into the new private parent rather than cashing out. To satisfy European ownership rules, easyJet suspended votes on 233.9MM shares held by non-EU investors, and Apollo’s funds will hold no more than 49.9% of the new parent (similar to Delta’s ownership interest in Virgin Atlantic. Headquarters will remain in the UK, along with its air operator certificates in the UK, Austria and Switzerland. The deal is expected to close by the end of March 2027, ending more than 25 years on the London Stock Exchange.
In its July 10 statement, Apollo stated it “believes in easyJet’s existing strategy,” naming three pieces: bigger aircraft, better ancillary and loyalty revenue, and “scaling Holidays into a structurally differentiated earnings stream.” The purchase is funded with Apollo equity plus debt that Barclays said it was highly confident it could arrange.
In a recent development, the three areas Apollo is targeting point to some common interests we have seen in the United States. More on that shortly.
The business it is buying is healthy. easyJet made £665MM in headline profit before tax in fiscal 2025, its third straight year of growth, with net cash of £602MM, per its annual results. easyJet holidays (alone) delivered £250MM of that profit and newly introduced targets have been established at £450MM by 2030. The gap Apollo will want to close is margin. easyJet’s top line EBIT of £703MM on £10.11bn of revenue in fiscal 2025 works out to 7%. Ryanair’s operating profit of €2.37bn on €15.54bn of revenue in its fiscal year to March 2026 is 15.3%, per its full year filing. Analysts quoted by Travel Weekly also count about 54 staff per aircraft at easyJet versus 43 at Ryanair. The aircraft capacity is roughly the same, though slightly higher with Ryanair.
Private equity in travel has produced some of the best deals ever made and some of the most spectacular failures, and the difference usually comes down to whether the buyer improved the business or just loaded it with debt.
Recent findings suggest that the best example is Hilton. Blackstone put up $6.5bn of equity in 2007 in a deal that was about 80% debt, wrote the investment down by 70% during the financial crisis, restructured, took Hilton public again in late 2013 and walked away with roughly $14bn in profit, the most profitable leveraged buyout in history. Blackstone credited growth in Europe and China, not financial engineering. I would politely disagree.
In a recent development, apollo has done this with an airline before. It bought Sun Country in 2018, kept CEO Jude Bricker and backed his shift toward a LCC model with denser cabins and ancillary fees, and took it public in March 2021, selling 9MM shares at $24 for about $218MM. This May, Allegiant closed a roughly $1.5bn acquisition of Sun Country. That’s a little less than 7x its initial investment so by percentage a better deal than Blackstone’s Hilton turn, but less nominal profit by a hefty margin.
Indigo Partners bought Frontier from Republic in 2013 in a deal valued at about $145MM (which seems really cheap in retrospect), with only $36MM paid in cash for the equity, and Frontier’s April 2021 IPO sold 30MM shares at $19, about $570MM. Bain Capital bought Virgin Australia out of administration (bankruptcy) in 2020, cut Tigerair (its wholly-owned ULCC), long-haul flying and freight, and re-listed the airline in June 2025 with a A$685MM offering, which Morningstar credits with lowering complexity and improving margins.
According to recent reports, the failures look different. Greybull Capital took control of Monarch in 2014 through a £125MM recapitalization, and in October 2017 Monarch became the biggest airline failure in UK history, leaving about 110,000 travelers to be flown home by the government and 860,000 future bookings canceled. I had flown Monarch a few years earlier when I lived in the UK and had never considered that an airline might shut down to the extent that repatriation flights by the government would be necessary. For those who aren’t familiar, Monarch was a mid-sized leisure airline squeezed between Ryanair and easyJet, with no cost advantage and a buyer that could not supply one.
Of the five deals above, four created value and one collapsed. The winners bought businesses with a strong franchise and either grew them or simplified them. The loser bought a weak airline and hoped. easyJet is far closer to the first group.
Southwest was not bought out, but it went through the closest thing the US has seen to a private equity overhaul. Activist investor Elliott Management took a $1.9bn stake in 2024, reached about 16% at its peak and won board seats. Under that pressure Southwest started charging for checked bags on tickets booked from May 28, 2025, cut about 1,750 corporate jobs, added extra legroom seating and ended open seating in January 2026.
It has been revealed that I expected that sameness to be the death of Southwest. I was wrong. Third quarter 2026 revenue hit a record $8.4bn, up 21.2%, revenue per available seat mile rose 21.6% on slightly less capacity, and net income rose to $270MM from $54MM, per its third quarter filing. Fuel has since forced a guidance cut, as it has for everyone, but the commercial changes are working. Elliott has already cut its stake to about 9% and given up two board seats, which is what investors do once the thesis has played out. I still have questions about how management talks about its plans, but becoming more like everyone else made Southwest more money.
The obvious Apollo playbook is to make easyJet look more like Ryanair: fewer staff per aircraft, more fees, tighter turns and a margin that closes in on Ryanair’s 15%. Some of that will happen. But easyJet cannot become Ryanair without giving up what makes it easyJet, which is primary airports like Gatwick and the slots that come with them. My bet is that easyJet becomes something else: a holiday company with an airline attached, closer to Jet2 than to Ryanair, where the plane is the distribution channel and the package is the profit. Apollo named Holidays specifically, the unit already earns more than a third of group profit, and a private owner does not have to explain to the market every quarter why it is growing a tour operator instead of an airline.
Industry observers note that but it also named loyalty and in the case of Southwest, that changes the shape of the airline. Southwest is adding up to 15 lounges, introducing a premium card, and adding international partners (with redeemable awards coming eventually) which makes it far more like a legacy carrier. It makes sense that Apollo wants to add more loyalty revenue but Europe has challenges in this space as card fees are lower and credit cards are generally more strictly controlled than in the US.
It also mentioned larger jets and that points to something else altogether. That’s more like the Alaska’s move in acquiring Hawaiian and launching long haul via widebodies and the Southwest move that they *totally* deny is going to happen. If easyJet did something with long haul it would have to avoid the trail of dead carriers from WOW! to Nordic that indicates it’s not such a good idea. I’d personally love to see what a trans-Atlantic easyJet operation would look like, but it’s also possible that the vague “larger jets” statement could just point to fewer A319s and A320s and more A321s.
History notes private equity in travel works when the buyer gets a strong franchise and makes it better, and fails when the buyer gets a weak one and adds debt (though this is not always the case). Apollo is getting a strong brand with net cash, a growing holidays business and room for growth. There is risk in the debt Barclays is arranging landing on top of a fuel shock and the extent in which this fuel shock persists. If Apollo uses its time out of the public markets to build the holidays business rather than strip the airline, easyJet comes back to the market in a few years as a better company. Maybe. If it chases Ryanair’s margin with Ryanair’s tactics at Gatwick prices, it will learn what Greybull learned at Monarch. I genuinely don’t think that will be the case, but only time will tell.
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