In a recent development, on 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The list includes some of the most visited sites in the world: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock.
Recent findings suggest that this is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect upcoming scripts being loaded and reveal suspicious connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, even though the original script was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an appropriate CSP in enforcement mode, organisations could have gone a step further and blocked key parts of the attack before they succeeded.
The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.
According to recent reports, most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we found it in only 1 of the 188 infected snippets, down from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your site uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, read on.
Recent findings suggest that optimizely Web works by having each customer load a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript (projectJS): custom code the customer writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on every page.
The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, and the rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet:.
We saw three versions of the injected loader:.
