This past week, the Newly introduced York Times published an article by Mike McIntire and Eli Murray alleging that a "pivotal legal test" for determining whether gun control laws are constitutional is "based on a misquote." Yet it appears it is the NYT's reporters who misfired.

Here is the article's basic claim:.

When the Supreme Court begins weighing the constitutionality of assault-weapons bans next month, the justices will be guided by the court's own precedent: a landmark ruling that such restrictions are allowed only if a firearm is both "dangerous and unusual.".

For nearly two decades, judges across the country have invoked this language to strike down gun-control laws. It is a pivotal legal test.

It is also based on a misquote.

Recent findings suggest that justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in the 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller, attributed the "dangerous and unusual" language to Sir William Blackstone, an 18th-century English jurist whose writings became the basis for much of American law.

But in his seminal 1769 treatise, "Commentaries on the Laws of England," Blackstone referred to weapons that were "dangerous or unusual," suggesting that a gun did not need to be both in order to be restricted.

But is there actually an error in the opinion? Here is the paragraph from Heller in which the alleged misquotation occurs, with the allegedly offending sentence underlined:.

Industry observers note that we also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons." See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O'Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

Note that the claim, with the quotation, is followed by a "See" string cite (followed, in turn, by a "See also" string cite of further authorities). If they were at all familiar with how legal citation works, this should have given the NYT reporters pause. As others have noted, the Supreme Court's style guide indicates that the "see" signal is not used for direct quotations. Rather it indicates that "the cited authority is basic source material supporting, although not stating, the text proposition" (emphasis added). Blackstone is cited first not because it is the dominant source but because the authorities are listed in chronological order.

What makes matters worse is that it appears the authors of the story were informed of all this before the story went to press. One of the story authors contacted John Bash, who clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia the term Heller was decided and worked on the case, and Bash explained all of this to the reporter, as Bash details in this LinkedIn post. Bash writes:.

It has been revealed that this is stunning. A recent article in The Upcoming York Times claims that District of Columbia v. Heller--the 2008 Supreme Court case holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own a firearm--contains a "misquote" of Blackstone. The supposed misquote is the phrase "dangerous and unusual weapons" in this passage:.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller remarked, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the time." 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons.".

It has been revealed that that passage is followed by the signal "See" and numerous citations, the first of which is Blackstone. The Blackstone source indicates "dangerous or unusual weapons" ("or" instead of "and"), but a number of the sources that follow say "dangerous and unusual weapons," in addition to sources that use the Blackstone disjunctive framing.

Back in October the Upcoming York Times reporter reached out to me about this, presumably because I was the law clerk for Justice Scalia on Heller. I immediately wrote back with a full on-the-record explanation of why there was no misquote. Yet the article does not refer to my explanation at all and asserts with no qualification that it was a misquote.

So if anyone is interested, I have posted my email below verbatim. I will also put in the comments my follow-up when the reporter asked me a question.

Here is the e-mail Bash sent to the reporter working on the story:.

Hi Mike, thanks for reaching out on this.

Even if I remembered any conversation with Justice Scalia about this particular point (which I don't), it would not be ethical for me to share private conversations I had during my clerkship wth Justice Scalia about the substance of opinions.

But just as an appellate lawyer, I don't see the problem. If the historical sources are mixed on the conjunctive or disjunctive framing, then it is true that there is an historical tradition of prohibiting weapons that are both dangerous and unusual, the narrower category that is encompassed by either framing. The fact that Blackstone is the first citation is just because the treatise citations are in chronological order (consistent with making a point about historical tradition), followed by case citations also in chronological order. The introduction of the treatise list with a "See" signal (rather than no signal) means that the quoted phrase is not necessarily a direct quote from each source (or any source)—as with the "See also" signal for the cases. And assuming that it's correct that the conjunctive sources all trace back to a single 18th Century treatise, that would not detract from the point that learned commentators had endorsed or applied that test through early American history, which is the point the text is making about historical tradition.

Here is the first follow-up e-mail Bash sent "in response to the reporter asking if he could quote me and whether the opinion purposefully omitted the Hawkins treatise quoted in the conjunctive-framing sources so that Blackstone would be first":.

Sure. Happy to take a look at the quote.

Can't speak to the thinking that went into the opinion, but I really doubt that. As I mentioned earlier, I don't think the provenance of the limitation is particularly relevant; the point was that commentators had recognized it throughout history. For example, in a Fourth Amendment case, a court might make the point that the curtilage rule—that the immediate vicinity of the home is considered part of the home—has been recognized through American history, citing late Eighteenth Century and Nineteenth Century treatises and cases. Even if that rule could be traced back to a single uncited treatise, that's not really the point. It's that courts and commentators endorsed it and so that history and tradition informs the constitutional analysis.

Sources indicate that and all that aside, I just think it is implausible that the paragraph would be understood differently if Blackstone had been the second citation rather than the first—especially since Hawkins was himself a very influential legal commentator (if I recall correctly). I've never heard of a court or litigant attributing weight to the order of sources subject to the same signal (e.g., "See"), which would seem to me especially unwarranted when the sources are presented chronologically (and so there is an obvious explanation for the ordering other than importance). As I noted before, I think all the sources together make clear a uniform historical tradition of prohibiting dangerous and unusual weapons, the category encompassed by all of their articulations of the rule.

Interestingly enough, the NYT article concludes citing a scholar affirming Bash's contention that, as the relevant passage claims, "there is an historical tradition of prohibiting weapons that are both dangerous and unusual," or as some would put it, those arms that are "unusually dangerous." Insofar as some lower courts have applied a different analysis, it is not clear to me how that is attributable to Scalia's language in Heller, or the contested passage.

The NYT story ends citing a scholar for the proposition that "relying on centuries-old legal precedents requires understanding how earlier generations used language." One might conclude that those writing on the Supreme Court should heed a similar admonition.

REVISION: The NYT has issued this response to criticism of the article:.

The Times's article reported that Justice Scalia wrongly attributed the direct quote "dangerous and unusual" to Blackstone. That is a fact, and one that has also been recognized by a federal appeals court. This reporting is an accurate portrayal of what Justice Scalia did.

In the Heller opinion, Justice Scalia chose to put the conjunctive phrase "dangerous and unusual" in direct quotes, and per legal style, citations for direct quotes should reflect the exact wording. Instead, he used a "see" signal to introduce 12 sources, only half of which were conjunctive. The rest, including Blackstone, used the disjunctive "dangerous or unusual.".

Following that, the result of the decision was to create a conjunctive doctrine that has since been inaccurately credited to Blackstone in hundreds of court briefs and opinions--including at the Supreme Court. Justice Clarence Thomas in a 2020 dissent wrote: "Sir William Blackstone concluded the Statute of Northampton banned only the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" He cited the Heller opinion as his source.

The article also highlights that there has been a debate over this language in the centuries since Blackstone's writing, how the language was used in Heller and how it's been used since.

It seems to me the Times is still not accounting for the meaning of the "see" signal, but readers can judge for themselves whether the Times has substantiated the broad claim made by the original article.

SECOND UPDATE: After John Bash's initial LinkedIn post, one of the Times reporters reached out with a defense of the story. The reporter's message was "off the record," but here was Bash's reply.

It has been revealed that there is obviously, at minimum, a substantial argument that it was not a misquote, especially given the ordinary use of the signal "see" and the fact that numerous sources come after. I don't understand how a straight news article, as opposed to an opinion piece, could state definitively that it is a "misquote" with no explanation of the contrary point of view, or even a modifier like "arguably" or "potentially."  The fact that judicial opinions sometimes use "See" unnecessarily does not detract from the basic meaning of that signal: Bluebook Signals Explained ("See indicates that the source clearly, though indirectly, supports a proposition. That is, the source does not directly state your proposition, but if a reader checked the source, it would be immediately clear to her that it supports your proposition."). And the fact that you didn't use quotes from people "on the other side" is irrelevant when the article exclusively articulates their point of view, as a fact no less.

More importantly, the article entirely omits that the historical point the sentence was making—that it has long been understood that "dangerous and unusual weapons" can be prohibited—is fully supported by sources that articulate either that specific framing or the broader disjunctive framing that encompasses the specific framing. Your statement that the Court's citation is "wrong" is simply not correct. The sentence does not say that Blackstone articulated a conjunctive formulation. It claims that there was an historical tradition of prohibiting "dangerous and unusual weapons."  Every cited source supports that proposition. And that is why "see" is used—the inference from the sources in their totality is that there was a tradition of prohibiting certain types of arms, even though none of the sources themselves specifically addresses the question of tradition.

It seems to me that a fair presentation would have laid this out for the readers and let them decide, rather than simply asserting that it was a misquote.

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