AI-assisted summary, reviewed by NullTX editors.
SlowMist claims five forged receipts with valid signatures let an attacker drain about $304,500 from Ankr's Ethereum bridge using one old Optimism deposit. Here is how the check failed.Every one of the five receipts was signed by the bridge's own trusted signer. Every one pointed to a deposit that had already been paid out.
On November 9, an attacker drained about $304,500 from Ankr's Ethereum cross-chain bridge. According to SlowMist's alert, the attacker built five forged receipts that all referenced a single legitimate Optimism transaction, changing the recipient, the token and the withdrawal amount in each one.
All five carried valid signatures from the bridge's trusted consensus signer.
It has been revealed that the reused transaction was tiny: a deposit of about 0.0044 ankrETH made on Optimism on November 3, which SlowMist's analysis says had already been redeemed on Ethereum the same day. Six days later, that one settled deposit was cited five times. The incident is recorded in the SlowMist Hacked database.Blockaid flagged the exploit as it unfolded, at about 08:42 UTC, with roughly $292,000 already gone. SlowMist followed at 09:14 UTC with the higher $304,500 estimate and an explanation of the forged receipts. Ankr paused withdrawals, and no recovery plan has been confirmed.
The design is common across lock-and-release bridges. A user deposits on the source chain, and an off-chain set of signers watches for that deposit and signs a receipt describing it. The destination contract, in this case Ankr's Ethereum bridge contract, checks that the receipt carries a valid signature and then releases the funds.That setup makes the signers the source of truth. The contract can't see Optimism, so it leans on the signature to prove the deposit happened. The weak point sits in the gap between "the signer signed this" and "this really happened." A contract that treats the first as proof of the second inherits every mistake the signing process makes.
According to recent reports, the Ethereum transactions show the attacker extracted about 82.91 ankrETH, 515,206 ankrPOL and 7.98 million ANKR tokens. Blockaid described the five withdraw calls as using the tiny Optimism deposit to unlock the bridge's locked inventory and send it to a fresh wallet.The mix of assets tells its own story. Each forged receipt named a different token and amount, which suggests the attacker picked targets based on what the bridge held. That fits receipts built entirely by the attacker, apart from the one real transaction reference. Anyone wanting to trace them can open the bridge contract's transaction list on Etherscan and filter for the five `withdraw` calls on November 9.
According to recent reports, the most crucial fact is still missing. SlowMist says the origin of the unauthorized signatures is under investigation, and it hasn't confirmed whether the signers were compromised.A valid signature on a forged receipt has a short list of explanations. A signing key, or the service holding it, could have been accessed. A signing service could have been tricked into signing attacker-supplied data. Or the signing logic itself could have a flaw that produces signatures for receipts it shouldn't. Each one points to a different fix: a stolen key means rotating signers, a manipulated service means tightening input validation off-chain, and a logic flaw means rewriting the signing rules.Whichever it turns out to be, the on-chain contract and the off-chain signer both failed to ask the same question. Either one verifying the source event would likely have stopped the attack, and neither did.
Sources indicate that the lessons are narrow and practical. Replay protection should key on the immutable identity of the source event, not on the receipt's contents, and a source event should be consumable exactly once. The destination contract should confirm that the receipt's recipient, token and amount match what the source-chain event actually recorded, using a proof or an independent verifier instead of trusting the signer alone.Signer infrastructure needs its own scrutiny. Threshold schemes, hardware-backed keys and strict limits on what a signing service will sign all shrink the damage from a single failure. Rate limits and per-withdrawal caps help as well. A bridge that can release its entire locked inventory in five calls has no brake once a signature check is defeated.Trust in a bridge comes in layers, and one layer rarely holds up alone. Owners with funds in Ankr's bridge should watch for the project's post-mortem and its strategy for restoring withdrawals. For developers, the question to put to their own code is a blunt one: if a signer signs something false, what stops the contract from believing it?
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