Oliver Melton is a Director with Rhodium Group’s China practice.
Logan Wright is a Partner at Rhodium Group and leads its research on China’s economy and financial markets. He is the author of the book Broken China: How the Economic Miracle Shattered and What it Means for the World.
Beijing’s Theory of Success in the Face of Failure.
According to recent reports, china has correctly diagnosed its most pressing economic problems. The Chinese Communist Party has acknowledged that its economy relies too much on investment and exports and that persistently weak household consumption is the core threat to future growth. The leadership also knows that this imbalanced growth model is causing trade friction with developed and emerging economies alike and will continue to do so. They know there is a growing chorus of economists (including many quiet voices in China) raising the alarm that, if Beijing does not make major changes soon, China will face ever-slower growth, cascading trade disputes, and potentially stagnating household income.
It has been revealed that but what is puzzling is that the country’s leaders are not acting. Beijing has confirmed only modest intends to boost household consumption and domestic demand, and its overall economic strategy remains essentially unchanged—focused on expanding investment in manufacturing, especially in advanced technologies and fresh strategic industries.
Theories abound as to why Beijing has chosen to ignore the warnings. Many speculate that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is not receiving accurate information or that he and his closest allies have abandoned development as a priority in favor of national security goals or a desire to control the commanding heights of global industry. Others argue that Beijing knows what it should do, but political or institutional constraints prevent it from taking decisive action.
In a recent development, in truth, while these factors all play a part in shaping policy, the real explanation is far simpler. The party is sticking to this path because the leadership believes it is working. It sees the same troubling data—including rising external surpluses, weak consumption, slower household income growth, weak credit demand, rising unemployment and underemployment, and persistent deflation—but it has reached wildly different conclusions about what these developments indicate and what Beijing should do in response.
Chinese economic policy is nested within a methodical planning process, which is meant to ensure that short-term pressures do not distract from long-term priorities. The problem is that the long-term strategy is predicated on the belief that control of advanced technologies and industry will trigger a new round of high-speed growth. This economic strategy can best be understood as a Marxism-infused misapplication of neoclassical economic development theory: Beijing is obsessed with control over technology and physical capital and believes that its ultrahigh levels of investment will accelerate productivity gains and wage growth. But a disproportionate focus on manufacturing and technology cannot increase productivity or wages if those investments are decoupled from the needs of the market and trends in aggregate final demand. This is especially true in a country as large as China—already the world’s largest exporter—that cannot rely on further exports to fuel growth.
According to recent reports, china’s worldview treats development as equivalent to capital accumulation and sees productivity as determined by the control and deployment of technology. It posits that the growth of the service sector, higher wages, and higher consumption are the consequences of that physical underlying foundation—they follow naturally in later stages of the development process once the productive industries have flourished. In this conception of economic development, the right strategy is always more investment, more industry, and more technology. The role of the state is to ensure that household savings and industrial profits are recycled through the state-owned banking system or government-guided capital into priority investments rather than frivolous activities, such as services or consumption. The resulting structural imbalance that weakens household income growth, the service sector, and public services was thus not an accident; in China’s economic development theory, this is seen as self-discipline that will pay off with more rapid long-term development.
A key corollary to this view is that the government’s macroeconomic management must guide resource allocation proactively through hands-on intervention, not impassively through interest rates and exchange rates. The state can harness the dynamism and ambition of markets to promote efficiency and innovation in defined spaces, but it is the government’s job to identify the correct focal points for investment to ensure that priority sectors grow at maximum speed and then to intervene to ameliorate imbalances when they inevitably arise.
In this conception of macroeconomics, the economy consists of a massive input-output table where every cell in the matrix is a sector that consumes other cells’ outputs and provides inputs to other producers. If there is an imbalance in supply or demand for certain products—which becomes evident in high or low prices—it may be because of overinvestment in the producing sector or underinvestment in downstream consuming sectors. Government policy seeks to increase output and steadily lower prices by facilitating investment and production throughout the matrix, adjusting the pace and balance of resource allocation as needed if one cell’s output exceeds the demands of the others. The goal is not to develop overcapacity or low profitability in these targeted sectors, but the optimal path for rapid development will inevitably push sectors in that direction.
According to recent reports, beijing has followed this playbook closely. When, for instance, the real estate sector collapsed in 2022 and the structural imbalances in China’s economy became too substantial to ignore, Beijing responded by increasing its efforts to micromanage credit flows, reversing experiments with interest rate liberalization and financial market reforms while tightening oversight of capital markets and industrial policy funding. Central bank relending facilities now channel low-cost bank loans to prioritize industrial upgrading and equipment purchases for targeted sectors. Thousands of government-run equity funds provide low-cost capital to firms that support a web of industrial and technology strategies. State-owned enterprises intervene to help boost valuations in the stock market, and regulators prioritize firms in strategic sectors for fresh listings. When a sector is overinvested, policy campaigns such as “anti-involution”—a neologism that describes a basket of discordant policies to resolve overcapacity—are deployed to slow future investment, buttress profitability by fixing prices, or set standards to restrict market entry in a bid to slow output while the other cells in the input-output tables catch up and restore balance over time.
In a recent development, although hard to comprehend in the context of a market economy, some aspects of this approach have an understandable internal logic in China, especially at a micro level. The collapse of the property sector—roughly a quarter of GDP at its peak—sent massive shock waves through very specific supply and demand pathways in the economy. It made sense for Beijing to calibrate policy for the affected sectors and think in terms of input-output tables as it designed its responses. The frequency of bubbles in China’s equity, commodity, and property markets over the past 15 years has left policymakers deeply wary of accommodative monetary policy for the entire economy, which helps explain why they are experimenting with more targeted tools aimed at specific sectors.
Likewise, a certain level of triumphalism in Beijing is understandable, given that Chinese companies are breaking into pole positions in major conventional industries, such as autos and telecommunications, and many others are poised to thrive in cutting-edge sectors, such as robotics and biotechnology—all in the wake of a massive hit to GDP. For a generation of economic policymakers who cut their teeth trying to revitalize a moribund planned economy in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, the emergence of world-leading (often private) firms is definitive evidence that Beijing has found a winning recipe. From this perspective, Beijing is also dismissive of foreign complaints about unfair market interventions or trade imbalances as the sour grapes of rich countries that had grown accustomed to rent-seeking technology monopolies.
Recent findings suggest that china’s leaders also see some deflation as the fruits of hard-won efficiency gains: the elimination of bottlenecks, economies of scale in manufacturing clusters, construction of world-class infrastructure, improved logistics, and removal of market barriers that have lowered costs up and down manufacturing supply chains. One-off cost reductions from efficiency gains or the abrupt loss of construction activity must be digested by the economy, they would argue, not offset by stimulus. And while foreign commentators and dignitaries warn of growing trade pushback, the data tells a surprisingly different story: China’s export growth barely slowed as the Trump administration imposed sweeping duties and the European Union set up defenses against a handful of sectors, such as electric vehicles.
The core problem with China’s economic strategy, however, is that aggregate domestic demand consistently falls far short of domestic supply. Chinese planners’ input-output tables will not balance unless domestic workers are buying the goods that China’s industries produce. Otherwise, everything else must be exported, often at lower prices. The leadership understands this in principle but believes that the control of advanced industries and technology will, ipso facto, cause productivity to rise, sustain economic growth into the future, and generate higher wages and therefore higher consumption.
Industry observers note that this is the flaw in Beijing’s approach—the dangerous legacy of vestigial Marxism and misapplied neoclassical growth theory. In reality, state intervention in markets can depress overall productivity and workers can see flat wages even when China succeeds at promoting advanced industries.
In a recent development, it is true that capital and technology create productivity gains in well-functioning market economies. But the causality usually breaks down if resources are allocated by policy interventions that are divorced from returns on investment. The control or ownership of advanced industries does not inherently cause economic growth, because they are far too small a share of the economy. Instead, latest products or technologies generate productivity when they are distributed and used throughout the economy in ways that improve efficiency or increase output. It is not the success of a robotics firm that leads to efficiency gains, for example, it is the deployment of its robots in factories to save production costs—namely by displacing workers—and boost output. If those benefits do not exceed the true cost of the new industrial robots—even with layers of subsidies—then the net effect is not positive, no matter how impressive the factories themselves are, or how successful the robotics firm itself appears.
The use of fresh production technologies also requires a degree of creative destruction that Beijing’s own industrial policy interventions have inhibited. When governments, not price-conscious firms, make technology and investment decisions, policymakers are not just gambling that they know better than the market how to boost long-run performance. They are also betting that they know how to use those technologies to create innovative new business models. Yet in China, state influence over resource allocation has ossified markets, especially by reducing bankruptcies, in ways that limit the fruits of innovation and efficiency gains in the broader economy. Additionally, much of China’s industrial policy aims to build self-reliance, which, by definition, focuses on duplicative investments that buttress domestic industrial prowess without necessarily adding efficiency.
Moreover, even though China’s many layers of industrial policy have helped launch successful companies and built an impressive fleet of ultramodern factories, there are also tremendous inefficiencies and waste that never make the headlines. Overall productivity must be calculated comprehensively, evaluating the net output gains against all the industrial subsidies, bad debts, foregone profits, and indirect support for investment that the government has provided. The reality is that China’s aggregate success rate is far lower than the shining stars would suggest: the remarkable global reach of electric vehicle and battery makers such as BYD, CATL, and Li Auto masks the dozens of failed companies that generated nonperforming loans and ate up unprofitable capital subsidies throughout the bulk of the sector and its supply chain. It is far from obvious that the net return on investment from industrial policy spending, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to be up to four percent of GDP, is positive, and it could be deeply negative, despite pockets of success.
Industry observers note that finally, Beijing is betting that superefficient manufacturing and success in strategic industries will eventually lead to higher wages, which will then cause consumption to surge. It is true that productivity growth causes real incomes to rise in a competitive market economy. But if investments in labor-saving technologies are driven by state policy, not returns on investment, wages can fall even as firms become more efficient. Rising household income requires a key intermediate step: employment, which is not a core characteristic of China’s capital-intensive, advanced manufacturing investment strategy. Indeed, state funding has helped China—a middle-income economy—become a world leader in high-tech “dark factories” that operate without distracting human accommodations, such as light. This may increase output in prized manufacturing cells in the input-output tables, but if demand for labor is not growing in aggregate, the whole equation starts to fall apart.
Still, the most pernicious consequence of Beijing’s economic model is entrenched deflation. The focus on expanding production combined with China’s weak consumer demand has caused the producer price index to fall for longer than it has risen over the past decade. This is a far larger threat to China’s economy than a mere nuisance of sectoral imbalances. Deflation reduces private-sector credit demand; undercuts incentives for new investments; and crushes employment, wage expectations, and, therefore, consumer confidence, which leads to weaker domestic demand—not in carefully demarcated input-output relationships but throughout the economy. Deflation also saps fiscal revenues and puts pressure on financial institutions in ways that severely limit the state’s capacity to act decisively the longer it lasts. Deflationary pressures in China also spill over to the global economy through cheaper exports and a weakening real exchange rate, driving more tensions between Beijing and its trading partners.
Recent findings suggest that there is immense risk in falling behind the curve in fighting deflation, but Beijing is not likely to change course if it continues to believe its strategy will boost productivity and jumpstart domestic demand in the long run. Some analysts speculate that Beijing could be forced into a reappraisal of its vision in response to unemployment pressures or the proliferation of foreign trade friction, but it has already shown its cards. The accumulation of unemployment, underemployment, and low wages for Chinese households and workers are already significant, yet Beijing has responded with only modest latest household subsidies and incremental investment in social services. Likewise, as external trade tensions have risen, Beijing has managed these country-by-country disputes as diplomatic issues, through a mix of threats and negotiations, to preserve the bulk of China’s export markets.
The decision to pursue short-term Band-Aid measures for a weak labor market and foreign trade tensions is confusing at first pass. For a government laser-focused on self-reliance and eliminating foreign dependencies, it is a curious strategy to become ever more dependent on foreign demand—over which Beijing has little control—as its primary driver of economic growth. Likewise, for a regime that is obsessed with social stability, it would seem prudent to focus more on wages and labor demand. Yet the strategy makes a degree of sense when viewed from the leadership’s perspective that China is in a transitional period. It may be unpleasant and difficult, but it is an unavoidable step on the path to a technology-led growth model.
Recent findings suggest that the leadership’s current confidence in this transition process means that it could be many years before the warning signs, already visible, become persuasive internally. This all but guarantees that Beijing will continue to defer action while deflationary pressures and external trade tensions build. Deflation and weak corporate profitability are already eroding China’s fiscal revenues, which have basically been flat in nominal terms since 2019. Deflation and the growing debt burden are also corroding the financial system, which will ultimately require large write-offs and recapitalization from the government budget to prevent credit growth from slowing further. A $54 billion bank recapitalization just took place two months ago, with little effect on lending.
Beijing’s ideological commitment to its industry- and technology-focused development strategy is creating a dangerous cycle that will likely produce weaker consumption, slower income growth, and even greater trade friction with the rest of the world. Moreover, in the face of such challenges, China’s economic leadership is compensating by expanding state intervention in the economy in ways that further undermine market forces and the independence of the private sector. At this rate, even if the leadership eventually recognizes the need to change strategy, China may not have the fiscal or financial space to rebalance the economy toward a more sustainable and diversified growth model.
