This is really "Bad design leads to chlorine gas poisining".

You have a local monitoring solution that *doesn't* sound an audible alarm, but just expects an email notification to drive? What the hell are they thinking, especially with a health and safety implication.

Sounds like the excess toxicity was the original failure, not a consequence.

The expected behavior that failed is actually letting people know to get out of the water.

Most nuclear power plants require electricity running to pumps to add water, while the radioactive material automatically is there.

In a recent development, most nuclear power plants require electricity running to pumps to add water, while the radioactive material automatically is there.perhaps, but how many nuclear power plants have no control-operators and no qualified on-site maintenance workers and no internal closed-circuit alarms and status indicators?I expect that these days, a hotel pool's maintenance has been so thoroughly outsourced that even the on-site maintenance person isn't really supposed to get involved with it. That maintenance person certainly isn't going to be in a position to be alerted to a chemical imbalance in the water.

Most nuclear power plants require electricity running to pumps to add water, while the radioactive material automatically is there.

perhaps, but how many nuclear power plants have no control-operators and no qualified on-site maintenance workers and no internal closed-circuit alarms and status indicators?

Recent findings suggest that I expect that these days, a hotel pool's maintenance has been so thoroughly outsourced that even the on-site maintenance person isn't really supposed to get involved with it. That maintenance person certainly isn't going to be in a position to be alerted to a chemical imbalance in the water.

In a recent development, who would set up an automation where the failure mode leads to uncontrolled addition of a toxic material?My friend you have a lot to learn about industry. The world is full of such systems and there is no recourse for it. There are just reductions in probability of a failure mode occurring. For fun look to international standards for safety instrumented systems such as IEC61508 or IEC61511, and note that in application of these standards you almost universally assume that automation systems would be an initiating cause for a potential event 1 in 10 years and you use that as a basis for determining your risk pr.

Who would set up an automation where the failure mode leads to uncontrolled addition of a toxic material?

Industry observers note that my friend you have a lot to learn about industry. The world is full of such systems and there is no recourse for it. There are just reductions in probability of a failure mode occurring. For fun look to international standards for safety instrumented systems such as IEC61508 or IEC61511, and note that in application of these standards you almost universally assume that automation systems would be an initiating cause for a potential event 1 in 10 years and you use that as a basis for determining your risk pr.

Indeed. A lot of incompetent assholes doing that these days. Blame technology when you were the one that screwed up the engineering and the configuration.

What the hell are they thinking, especially with a health and safety implication.What they were thinking is that they could hide their fuckups and keep them a secret.

What the hell are they thinking, especially with a health and safety implication.

What they were thinking is that they could hide their fuckups and keep them a secret.

Because the customers chose to use an unpredictable tool in a critical scenario.

This is really "Bad design leads to chlorine gas poisining".Title is clickbait. The summary mentions your "bad design" point, twice.

This is really "Bad design leads to chlorine gas poisining".

Recent findings suggest that title is clickbait. The summary mentions your "bad design" point, twice.

Even worse, the monitoring system should have defaulted to stop chlorination on error. Under-chlorinated water does not immediately become dangerous. Over-chlorinated water does.

This is just _really_ bad design and configuration of a dangerous system, nothing else. The MS outage is not at fault. It was just the last straw.

It's not really the automation that's the problem, it's the lack of follow through.

Recent findings suggest that good, it's automatically monitoring the chemicals. Bad, it doesn't actually do anything about it except send an email.

Industry observers note that if it was fully closed loop automation complete with clear and audible local alarm, then that would have been great. Though one could say it should still be backed up by a human doing a periodic manual check, just like my local cheap pool does every 30 minutes or so.

It's not really the automation that's the problem, it's the lack of follow through.

Good, it's automatically monitoring the chemicals. Bad, it doesn't actually do anything about it except send an email.

According to recent reports, for life and safety things, alerts are often closed-loop. That is, the system actually checks the alarm went off.

In a recent development, this can lead to some really interesting things - your car plays various beeps and chimes to indicate various status things. But did you know there is a microphone in the car listening to make sure those chimes actually play? Or if you have one of the fancy cars with LCD screens, every time it pops up an idiot light, the screen is actually read back by the controller to verify that the indication is actually displayed. The same goes for medical equipment - all those alarms and beeps are monitored and the equipment is making sure it's playing those sounds.

Critical alarms should have a backup system and a test system. It's why industrial control systems have lamp tests where you can verify the lamp is functional and not burned out. But also if a critical alert happens, it has a bunch of ways to alert you something has gone wrong. Even just having a loud klaxon would often get the attention of someone who could possibly be affected or at least people asking why there's a loud annoying sound being played.

Same efficiency as "Please contact us at 911@hotmail.com".

Dear Sir/Madam,I am writing to inform you of a fire that has broken out on the premises of 123 Cavendon Road... no that's too formalFire! Fire! Help me! 123 Cavendon Road! Looking forward to hearing from you. Yours truly, Maurice Moss.

In a recent development, dear Sir/Madam,I am writing to inform you of a fire that has broken out on the premises of 123 Cavendon Road... no that's too formal.

In a recent development, fire! Fire! Help me! 123 Cavendon Road! Looking forward to hearing from you. Yours truly, Maurice Moss.

This is what happens when you depend on an automated system to send you an emergency message. Ironically, on Tuesday the USA will be testing its nationwide Emergency Alert System, which depends on automated systems to send me an emergency message, with nothing to verify that the message was received.In the case of the EAS, it makes sense that the "endpoints" - the radio and television receivers - aren't monitored to "close the loop" to make sure the message is received.In the event of an actual emergency, your locality would probably be sounding audible emergency sirens. But those may not be design.

This is what happens when you depend on an automated system to send you an emergency message.

Ironically, on Tuesday the USA will be testing its nationwide Emergency Alert System, which depends on automated systems to send me an emergency message, with nothing to verify that the message was received.

In the case of the EAS, it makes sense that the "endpoints" - the radio and television receivers - aren't monitored to "close the loop" to make sure the message is received.

Industry observers note that in the event of an actual emergency, your locality would probably be sounding audible emergency sirens. But those may not be design.

Many local authorities in the US no longer have air-raid sirens ... I remember that the town where I grew up in NJ used to have one in the 90s and test it on Sundays at noon. It would also be used to call the volunteers to the fire station - but I guess it was considered redundant with better pagers and cell service. It was removed sometime in the 00s.

Sources indicate that OTOH, Poland DOES have working sirens. I remember getting the scare of my life when every siren in town went off on 1 August at exactly 5 pm local time - t.

Sources indicate that it should also not just send an alarm but shut down the chlorination. That may become problem after a day or longer, while over-chlorination is a potentially deadly problem now. What they did is a really bad safety design made by complete idiots.

It has been revealed that yes, clearly MS is poorly managed. But no German court will put any blame on them here.

Oh my ... may still be too soon. Yikes.

Germans like the poison gas.I was wondering if it was a World War One theme park.

I was wondering if it was a World War One theme park.

I was wondering if it was a World War One theme parkProbably, they were just rehearsing for their "Blasangriff mit Grünkreuz!" re-enactment.

I was wondering if it was a World War One theme park.

Probably, they were just rehearsing for their "Blasangriff mit Grünkreuz!" re-enactment.

It's the Gift that keeps on giving.

Sources indicate that email is typically pretty reliable, but it can fail completely and depends on the customers noticing. That makes it unsuitable as alerting channel unless it gets closely monitored. The main thing email is is interoperable and convenient and quite cheap for what it offers.

Dear Sir/Madam, I'm writing to inform you of a fire, which has broken out... [youtu.be].

Recent findings suggest that if the system knows there is an problem, especially with a toxic chemical, why in Thor's name was it not set up to enable an automatic shutdown? Bad design ... very bad design. I can't see how Microsoft can take any of the blame for this.

According to recent reports, if the system knows there is an problem, especially with a toxic chemical, why in Thor's name was it not set up to enable an automatic shutdown? Bad design ... very bad design. You're confusing control and safety. It was almost certain there were different systems responsible for dosing and determining if something is safe, and in this case *both* failed. One overdosed, the other (was really shitty designed) failed to send an email.The system that dosed didn't know there was an issue. The system that detected an overdose knew there was an issue but like every *mitigation* measure it can't unfuck that which has been fucked up.That's the fundamental problem with mitigation systems.

If the system knows there is an issue, especially with a toxic chemical, why in Thor's name was it not set up to enable an automatic shutdown? Bad design ... very bad design.

Sources indicate that you're confusing control and safety. It was almost certain there were different systems responsible for dosing and determining if something is safe, and in this case *both* failed. One overdosed, the other (was really shitty designed) failed to send an email.

Recent findings suggest that the system that dosed didn't know there was an issue. The system that detected an overdose knew there was an issue but like every *mitigation* measure it can't unfuck that which has been fucked up.

That's the fundamental problem with mitigation systems.

Industry observers note that yes. A dangerous failure mode is a massive screw-up in itself. There no blame on MS for this incident. While MS is pretty incompetent and their products suck badly, that does not mean they are responsible for everything that goes wrong involving their products.

Sources indicate that you're suffering from Chlorine poisoning? Have you checked your spam folder?

According to recent reports, they failed to implement an additional notification mechanismThey did not fail to implement an additional notification mechanism. They failed to implement the primary notification system. The one that is on site, immediately apparent to those immediately responsible. This really has nothing to do with Microsoft at all. I'm no Microsoft fanboi, but damn: this is some mad bullshit. Next they'll yammer something about "COVID.".

They failed to implement an additional notification mechanism.

In a recent development, they did not fail to implement an additional notification mechanism. They failed to implement the primary notification system. The one that is on site, immediately apparent to those immediately responsible.

Industry observers note that this really has nothing to do with Microsoft at all. I'm no Microsoft fanboi, but damn: this is some mad bullshit. Next they'll yammer something about "COVID.".

In a recent development, this is the whole point of Lock Out, Tag Out safety procedures. You lock it out and put an out of service sign on it. Pretty straight forward.

According to recent reports, the person that sent the alert needed to take a walk and kick people out and lock the door. The person that sent the email knew, somehow, about the concern. Sounds like its not an issue of monitoring but an issue of what happens when the monitor triggers an alert.

A machine sent an email, not a person.

This is the whole point of Lock Out, Tag Out safety procedures. You lock it out and put an out of service sign on it. Pretty straight forward.It seems like you didn't understand what happened here remotely. The system failed in operation not during maintenance. The analyser system sent an alert email (stupid design) which didn't get through. At no point was a person involved, and at no point was there maintenance or equipment out of service.

This is the whole point of Lock Out, Tag Out safety procedures. You lock it out and put an out of service sign on it. Pretty straight forward.

It seems like you didn't understand what happened here remotely. The system failed in operation not during maintenance. The analyser system sent an alert email (stupid design) which didn't get through. At no point was a person involved, and at no point was there maintenance or equipment out of service.

Recent findings suggest that cybersecurity architect and computer scientist Stephan Skrobisch said Microsoft is not responsible for the incident. "It's clearly the system's design that's the problem. They failed to implement an additional notification mechanism." With the rollout of unchecked AI everything everywhere, this incident will be cute by comparison. It all comes down to people trusting something and letting their guard down.... as do most nuclear meltdowns. But this time it will be banks, manufacturing plants, traffic signals, game systems, phones, cars and all sorts of machinery. It's going to be wild.

Cybersecurity architect and computer scientist Stephan Skrobisch said Microsoft is not responsible for the incident. "It's clearly the system's design that's the problem. They failed to implement an additional notification mechanism.".

With the rollout of unchecked AI everything everywhere, this incident will be cute by comparison. It all comes down to people trusting something and letting their guard down.... as do most nuclear meltdowns. But this time it will be banks, manufacturing plants, traffic signals, game systems, phones, cars and all sorts of machinery. It's going to be wild.

Everybody needs a gimmick these days.

No, it was "All Quiet on the Western Front".

Everything requiring an always-on Internet connection and reliable services makes for a wonderful fairytale to sell to managers looking to trim their labor and maintenance costs. But the monthly fees pile up and the lower reliability and catastrophic failure modes are not accounted for at all. This is the future, and I see no real pushback against it.

Which has places where heavy moving machinery and personnel share physical space.

At one point in my career, I was responsible for the safety and interlock systems that make this arrangement possible.

There are hard-wired interlocks, PLC-logic interlocks and shutdowns, and a crap-ton of procedures to make sure machinery is de-energized when personnel are present.

Sources indicate that there is an email alert that goes out if telemetry packets stop flowing from one safety-critical system to another. But the email is the cherry on to.

It has been revealed that adding to what everyone noted about having other alarms, this email alarm was backwards. Your default case should be sending a default signal through the same pathway the emergency alert goes through. If the pool was sending out daily "chlorine is fine" emails then the management team should have noticed the missing email and looked into it prior to people getting sick. Their failure resulted in an "everything is good" signal. Any type of failure should never result in a good signal, thus using no signal.

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